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Mental Imagery, Psychology, and Rhetoric : 
An Examination of Recurring Problems 
Linda T. Calendrillo 
A s writing specialists we often cross into psychology to inform our composing theories and practices. However, mental imagery in our field is 
not fully recognized as an area of inquiry from which to draw our theories. This 
is a mistake for those of us interested in enhancing our thinking about writing 
from the fullest possible range of disciplines. But this neglect is not surprising. 
Research into mental imagery is fraught with debate over its nature and the 
legitimacy of studying it .  Indeed, by examining the parallels between the 
contemporary debate in psychology and the class ical  rhetorical debate 
surrounding the use of the mnemonic image, I show that the marginalizing of 
mental imagery in rhetorical theory and pedagogy is an old phenomenon. 
In this article I look at the conceptual problems psychologists face as they 
describe, test, and apply mental imagery to show that we can trace similar problems 
in rhetorical history. I look at the contemporary debate between the pictorialists­
those who believe mental images are like photographs in the mind-and the 
descriptionalists-those who hold that mental images represent ideas or sentences in 
the mind (Finke, 1 989; Pinker & Kosslyn, 1983; Tye, 1984). 
Let me summarize the problems that psychologists discuss when they 
describe empirical difficulties in experimenting with mental imagery. Ronald 
Finke ( 1989) in Principles of Mental Images isolates what he sees as two basic 
problems in studying mental imagery. Finke says mental images are first, 
subjective and second, elusive. Their subjectivity comes from their idiosyncratic 
nature (different individuals will image a bird differently), and so researchers 
have difficulty testing mental images (they cannot insure that the images they 
are comparing are in fact comparable, which leads researchers to fear inaccurate 
results) .  The mental images are also elusive (one person's bird may last longer as 
a mental representation than the next person's,  and when the subject tries to 
regain the bird image, she or he may find a different bird or no bird at all) .  These 
difficulties make imagery research, Finke says, controversial. 
These concerns resemble the classical disagreement on the viability of 
mental imagery as a mnemonic device. This debate hinges on the utility of the 
loci mnemonic, an imagery-based mnemonic art consisting of a series of mental 
images an individual imposes on memory to enhance the recall of information. 
The individual forms unusual and violent images and stores them in a sequence 
of previously selected holding places in the mind. For example, to remember five 
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name s ,  a person might image each individual wi th various bruises  in a 
separate room in the person's home. This strategy for layering images,  called the 
loci mnemonic, was embraced by Cicero ( 1 948) in De Oratore as a longstanding 
and highly regarded mnemonic, but was rejected by Quintilian ( 1 922) in his 
Institutio Oratoria a century later. Though the loci strategy was taught and used 
consistently through the Middle Ages, Quintilian's attack on it  made its presence 
circumspect. Quintilian 's argument against the loci mnemonic included some of 
the same strictures that Finke pinpoints as inhibiting mental imagery research 
today. Although Quintilian provided a clear description and analysis  of the 
imaging strategy, he declared it overly complicated and unteachable, saying, in 
fact, "My precepts . . .  will be of a simpler kind" (p. 227). We are given to under­
stand that since the loci method was difficult to recreate, to track, and, as 
Quintilian believed, to teach, its value was suspect. At best, it  was appropriate 
for remembering long lists of names but otherwise an incumbrance. Indeed, 
because it relied on a solitary learner, the loci did not lend itself to the rote 
memorizing that Quintilian favored. In part, the medieval use of alphabet books, 
commonplace books listing prescribed images for each corresponding letter, 
reflected a retreat from independent images. This same disregard of the loci as 
unteachable was repeated by Geoffrey of Vinsauf ( 1 97 1 )  in the early thirteenth 
century when he said, "Tully [Cicero] relies on a theory of exotic images,  which 
it is  well to remember; but he is  teaching himself and is, as it  were, the sole 
devotee of his subtle system which is  of a subtlety unique to himself" (p. 1 05) .  
Quintilian ( 1 922) also foreshadowed the debate on the nature of the image 
that is  argued by the pictorialists and descriptionalists. As a descriptionalist, 
Quintilian believed that images were simply metaphoric representations of ideas 
and language which he did not believe could be adequately visualized. Quintilian, 
in analyzing the loci mnemonic, worried that words would be lost or confused as 
images replaced them in individuals' mind. He argued against using the loci strat­
egy to help remember texts: "How can such an art grasp a whole series of con­
nected words?" (p. 225). In fact, he saw the method as a hindrance to a rhetor: 
"Will not the flow of our speech inevitably be impeded by the double task im­
posed on our memory?" (p. 227). This double task is  translating words into im­
ages and then retranslating them back into words. Quintilian feared that the rhetor 
would be unable to translate some words, a decidedly descriptionalist perspec­
tive. He also feared that the images when recalled later for linguistic transcrip­
tion would not accurately match the words that triggered the image. Quintilian 's  
position, which valued the verbal over the visual, ignored Cicero's  contention 
that images were more vivid and more easily recalled than words. 
Research methodologies today create difficulty for those examining mental 
imagery, by muddying research results and complicating discussions. When 
testing memory strategies, psychologists often investigate the classical directive 
to use bizarre or violent images to enhance recall (Rollins, 1 989; Riefer, 1 992). 
This particular component of the classical imagery mnemonic (Rhetorica ad 
Herennium, 1 954)  has been studied broadly in psychology, perhaps in part 
because it allows for a relatively straightforward empirical design that measures 
whether or not exotic images are recalled more easily than neutral images (Riefer, 
1 99 2 ) .  To es tabl i sh  this  empirical  d e s i g n ,  researchers need only  g i v e  
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directions for storing images that differ in their description of the nature of the 
image (one group gets bizarre/violent, while the other does not) . Researchers 
have tested this principle with uneven results (Richardson, 1 987;  Rollins, 1 989). 
In memory research that examines the loci mnemonic, this empirical design also 
recurs, with often inconclusive or contradictory results. 
Studying violent images may in itself be problematic in contemporary 
Western culture. If subjects used for these tests are desensitized to unusual im­
ages in the films they watch or the news they see, the classical prescription for 
those images may not be effective for them. I make this suggestion in part based 
on the work of John Richardson, a psychologist who questions the research 
methods used in memory work. In his 1 987 critique "Social Class Limitations on 
the Efficacy of Imagery Mnemonic Instructions," Richardson suggests that the 
socio-economic backgrounds of the typical research subjects (college students) 
skew the results of that research. These subjects, he argues, are empowered by 
social class and believe themselves capable of performing well on such tests, are 
empowered to learn, and consequently may use  learned s trategies  more 
effectively than those from less privileged backgrounds. Richardson ' s  critique of 
memory testing can apply to the bizarreness tests. Would Riefer and Rouder 's 
study ( 1 992) have yielded the same results had their subjects not been University 
of California-Irvine students? Richardson encourages us to doubt the ability to 
generalize from these and the results of other studies. 
Major shifts in the treatment of the image, I believe, began in Western culture 
during the Middle Ages. We again see something of a fringe science when imagery 
was relegated to the status of memory enhancer to help Christians adhere to virtue 
and avoid vice (Carruthers, 1990; Yates, 1966). To claim that imagery was used 
during this extended period to teach illiterate people religious principles is an 
oversimplification, but a useful one. The architecture of the times used statuary ex­
tensively to represent virtue and condemn vice, especially in its cathedrals. Relics 
that were valued as talismans of goodness and power were housed in containers that 
recreated the artifact in some fashion. A fragment of St. Louis's jaw, for example, is 
enclosed in a gold bust in Paris's Cathedral of Notre Dame. Symbolizing the relic this 
way reminds viewers of its strength and its material wealth and of the value of living 
virtuously. The notion that illiteracy necessitated the iconography of the Christian 
faith may be partially responsible for the devaluing of the mental image in a literate 
culture. If words are preferred as efficient codes of thought and if images are tied to 
lower class illiterate cultures, then valuing images reveals social class and ignores 
literacy as a status symbol. 
In contemporary thinking, mental imagery, even when discussed by those 
who support its validity, is often described in preliterate terms as well. For 
example, Finke ( 1 990), in Creative Imagery: Discoveries and Inventions in Visu­
alization, endorses using mental imagery as a "preinventive form," an almost 
primitive term which Finke uses to identify "the products of combinational play 
of visualization" (p. 3), wherein individuals form, combine, and manipulate im­
ages in ways we might call a prose invention strategy. This view of the mental 
image is also reflected in Flower and Hayes ' s  ( 1 984) "Images, Plans,  and Prose," 
in which non-verbal imagery is  listed as a preconscious form of cognition along 
with structural relationships and procedural knowledge. In a chapter of his book 
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called "Imagery on the Bounds of Cognition," Mark Rollins ( 1 989) tells us that 
"a theory of mental imagery can elucidate a range of i s sues from animal 
cognition to artistic creation" (p. 1 32) .  Though Rollins' statement does not 
intend to disparage mental imagery, I am struck by the marginalizing language 
he chooses. Mental imagery as a mode of thinking is  something done by dogs and 
artists; medievally, thinking in images was something done by the uneducated, 
and only those on the fringe of our field seem to be studying or endorsing its use. 
When we begin to look at where in composition studies the use of mental 
imagery is most often cited, we see continued neglect. Mental imagery is used by 
some cognitive psychologists in a range of applications: to solve problems, think 
creatively, and enhance memory; in psychotherapy mental imaging is used to 
reduce stress and combat phobias; and in athletic training to improve physical 
performance. Yet, currently mental imagery is  not seriously considered by most 
mainstream composition theorists as a viable component of the process.  It is  an 
area of concern within NCTE's  Assembly for Expanded Perspectives on Learn­
ing (AEPL), established in large part by Alice Brand and Richard Graves. This 
concern is further endorsed in Brand and Grave ' s  Presence of Mind, which 
includes essays on mental imagery. But apart from its inclusion in the work of 
AEPL, what little work is  being done in mental imagery is in technical writing. 
Though this application represents a beginning, it unwittingly reinforces some of 
the same marginalizing of mnemonic imagery strategies of the ancient Roman 
rhetoricians. In an article, "Using Visual Mnemonics to Make Instructions Easier 
to Remember," in the Journal of Technical Writing and Communication, for in­
stance, Hirst ( 1 990) endorses visual mnemonics but does so in a way that contra­
dicts both the principles of the classical loci mnemonic and contemporary 
psychological thinking. However, this treatment is  in keeping with the spirit of 
medieval imagery. 
Though Hirst cites the work of contemporary imagery psychologists and 
memory researchers, along with the class ical mnemonic imagery strategy 
discussed in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, his strategies contradict these sources. 
Hirst instructs those who write technical instructions to use cartoon images to 
enhance their readers' recall of information. These cartoon images toy with the 
physical properties of objects, thereby exaggerating cartoons even more. For 
example, to create an image for tuning an engine, the cartoon might show a man 
drawn much smaller than a car engine handling an enormous and angry spark 
plug. (This same strategy was used by the Pentagon in the 1 950s  when i t  
enlisted Will Eisner ' s  talents to  prepare comic books for soldiers to  train them 
in auto mechanics.) 
Hirst 's  use of mental imaging falls short of both classical and contemporary 
strategies. First, one essential element of the classical mnemonic is the idiosyn­
cratic nature of the image; for the image to be recalled, persons storing the image 
must create their own image. According to the author of the Rhetorica Ad 
Herennium ( 1 954):  
Often in fact when we declare that one form resembles another, we 
fail to receive universal assent, because things seem different to 
different persons. The same is  true with respect to images:  one that 
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is well-defined to us appears relatively inconspicuous to others . 
Everybody, therefore, should in equipping himself with images suit 
his own convenience. (p. 223) 
Hirst's treatment of images echoes the medieval creation of stock images and 
reinforces the historical marginalizing of the image. 
Although Hirst's treatment of the image does not coincide with the classical 
mnemonic system, his modern, technical version does mimic a strategy used in 
constructing "emblem" books of the early Renaissance (Freeman, 1 970; Lechner, 
1 962; Thompson, 1 924). These books used a text to exemplify a woodcut that 
v i sually represented a virtue or vice, teaching a lesson both v isually and 
verbally. Problems arose, however, in producing emblem books due to new and 
often faulty technology. The woodcuts that the emblematic texts were meant to 
gloss were difficult and expensive to produce; therefore, it became routine for 
printers to use whatever woodcut they had on hand. Rather than create text and 
image, authors of emblem books chose to write texts to match the available 
woodcuts. This practice resulted in a kind of seventeenth-century clip art, wherein 
often inappropriate images were used as a gloss on texts. The image became 
secondary to the text, functioning as an ornament rather than as the subject of the 
lesson and the means by which the lesson was  effectively learned .  This  
standardization of the image relegated it  to  a secondary status, mirroring again 
its position as less valuable than verbal representations. 
Today, the difference between emblem books and mental imagery echoes the 
polarization between pictorialists and descriptionalists by refocusing attention 
on their competing status. Which is predominant? Which has more validity, more 
integrity? Are mental images real pictures (Platonic embodiments of the thing 
itself) or are the pictures simply metaphors, constructed from visually powerful 
terms to articulate ideas? Can researchers develop tests that measure whether 
subj ects are translating v isual images into external pictures ,  or trans lating 
picture images into words, or combining these two operations in some way? Can 
we answer the philosophical question of which comes first, the image or the word? 
(Finke, 1 989;  Rollins, 1 989). 
In contemporary writing pedagogy we must be aware of the complexities 
implicit in the use of mental imagery and of the problematic history that sur­
rounds it. But more important, we need to consider how mental imagery can help 
writer create texts, how mental imagery reinforces the way writers arrange texts, 
and most difficult perhaps, how readers of texts use mental imagery to enhance 
their understanding of, their enj oyment of, and their use of those texts. The ways 
in which we discuss mental imagery in our discipline should not further divide 
us into those who fit the mainstream and those who are peripheral to it. 
And although we need to study the psychological processes in mental 
imagery, we need to remind ourselves that this work is  not without limitations. 
Not only must we consider the cultural interferences Richardson warns us of, but 
we also need to be aware of the mechanization of the mental image. Prominent 
cognitive psychologist, Geoffrey Loftus ( 1 989), alludes to these limitations when 
he says, "Computer simulations are seducing us away from doing real creative 
thinking in the behavioral sciences" (as cited in Finke, p.  145) .  Even today we 
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fall into the trap that beset the late emblem authors. Current psychological work 
in mental imagery constructs computer simulations. It attempts to pinpoint the 
relationship between mental and physical images and discusses them in technical 
vocabulary that mimics the mechanical. Even Kosslyn and Shwartz's ( 1 977) model 
of mental images, which arises from a pictorialist view, describes mental images 
as having scanning, zooming, and rotating computer-like properties. Though we 
cannot deny this view of imaging, we must not be seduced by it, away from the 
creative thinking we need to make mental imagery a valuable part of composi­
tion theory and practice. cQj 
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